The Third Circuit held that a plaintiff must allege an injury in order to come within Article III?s requirement that a plaintiff can factually establish an “injury in fact” traceable to the defendant’s conduct and can be redressed by a judicial remedy. This standing requirement derives from Article III?s limitation of the judiciary’s role to resolving “cases” and “controversies.” In Estrada v. Johnson & Johnson, part of the In re: Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder Products Litig., 903 F.3d 278 (3d Cir. 2018) plaintiff claimed that use of Johnson & Johnson?s Baby Powder can lead to an increased risk of developing ovarian cancer and that, if she had known of the risk, she would not have bought the powder in the first place. The District Court dismissed her claims and, on appeal, she argued that she had not received the benefit of the bargain. She claimed to nonetheless deserve damages because the purported risk of cancer renders the baby powder’s worth less than what she paid for the product. The Third Circuit, per Chief Judge D. Brooks Smith, affirmed the dismissal and noted that Estrada must “do more than simply pair up a conclusory assertion of money lost with a request that the defendant pay up.”
Two factors supported the court’s conclusion that Estrada could not satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. First, she will continue to purchase a product she alleges is unsafe, and will do so without any discount to compensate for the powder being worth less, as Estrada claims in her complaint. Second, Estrada did not allege that the baby powder posed a cancer risk to her; rather, her complaint argues that J&J’s product was unsafe as to others. To her, the baby powder was safe and provided her the very benefits it claimed. In conclusion, the court held that Estrada got exactly what she bargained for; she could not establish standing based solely on buyers’ remorse.