In Maynard. et. Al. v. Snapchat, Inc., No. A20A1218. (GA Appellate, January 25, 2023), the Georgia Court of Appeals, on remand from the Georgia Supreme Court, determined that the trial court erred by granting Snapchat’s motion to dismiss on proximate cause grounds. Here, plaintiffs Wentworth and Karen Maynard alleged that Defendant Christal McGee was using Snapchat’s ?Speed Filter? and driving over 100 miles per hour when she rear-ended them, causing severe injuries. The ?Speed Filter? is a feature that allows the user to record their real-life speed on a photo or video and share it with other users. Plaintiffs sued Snap as well, alleging that Snap had negligently designed the ?Speed Filter? because the filter promoted unsafe driving and encouraged dangerous behavior. Snap moved to dismiss the negligent design claim, arguing it had no legal duty to prevent a driver from driving recklessly or negligently and that McGee’s speeding or inattention was an intervening cause that broke the causal chain.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals previously affirmed, holding that Snapchat did not owe a legal duty to the plaintiffs because a manufacturer’s duty to design reasonably safe products does not extend to people injured by a third party’s intentional and tortious misuse of the manufacturer’s product. But the Court did not address proximate causation. A divided Georgia Supreme Court reversed the dismissal on the basis of legal duty and remanded the case for further consideration of the proximate causation issue. The Court reasoned that, under Georgia law, a manufacturer’s duty to use reasonable care in selecting from alternative designs is triggered only by reasonably foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product. The Georgia Supreme Court also concluded that Georgia law does not hold, per se, that a manufacturer can never have a duty to use reasonable care in designing its products if a third party used a product intentionally and tortiously.
Because the plaintiffs’ complaint alleged facts that, if proven, sufficiently demonstrate that Snap’s negligent design proximately caused the plaintiffs’ injuries, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment granting Snap’s motion to dismiss on proximate cause grounds the second time around. Based on the facts as alleged, i.e., users were driving in excess of 100 miles per hour to record excessive speeds and share them among their peers, the Court of Appeals determined that a finder of fact could infer that Snap’s Speed Filter was a proximate cause of the collision.