550 WARNINGS EXPERT Qualifications (2008)

In an interesting decision the Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit held that a “true warnings expert” was not required in a case where the contention was that a warning should be given rather than that an existing warning or instruction was ineffective, misleading or otherwise defective. In Jose Pineda v. FordMotor Company, 2008 WL 756698, (3rd Cir. 2008) Plaintiff was an automobile technician who was injured when the rear liftgate glass of a 2002 Ford Explorer shattered while he was working on the vehicle. Plaintiff sued Ford for his injuries originally alleging both a design defect and a failure to warn. During the course of the proceedings the allegation of a design defect was withdrawn and the case proceeded only on the failure to warn claim.

Plaintiff’s expert was a professional engineer with experience in materials analysis and systems failure analysis. Expert testified at a Daubert hearing that he was not a warnings expert, except to the extent that “a warning and instructions are solutions to an engineering problem.” The Court granted theDaubert motion to exclude the expert’s testimony and then entered summary judgment. The district court had determined that the only permissible expert was a “warnings expert” and relied primarily on the expert’s own statement at theDaubert hearing that he did not offer himself as a warnings expert.

In reversing the district court the Court of Appeals pointed out that the expert did not opine on how a warning should be worded or how it should appear in order to effectively convey its message to an automobile technician. The court said:

“He only testified that neglecting to follow the steps of an instruction when replacing the 2002 Explorer’s liftgate brackets and hinges might result in failure of the liftgate glass, and that a warning was necessary to alert a technician to that potential problem. Clausner was substantively qualified to testify on this point because a proper warning is also a solution to an engineering problem.

Therefore, we hold that Clausner should have been qualified as an expert although he may not have been the”best qualified” expert or did not have the “specialization”that the District Court deemed necessary.”