The Supreme Court of the United States recently held that there could be an appeal of a remand order entered by a district court after it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims. In Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc. ______ S. Ct. ____ (2009) WL 1174837 U.S., 2009. The district court dismissed a lawsuit’s only federal claim and then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state court claims. The trial court then remanded the case to state court. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed the petitioners appeal finding that the remand order could be colorably characterized as based on a “lack of subject matter jurisdiction” over the state law claims, ?1447 (c), and therefore “not reviewable on appeal” ?1447 (d). The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Court said:
“This Court has not yet decided whether a district court’s order remanding a case to state court after declining exercise supplemental jurisdiction is a remand for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction for which appellate review barred by ??1447 (c) and (d). See Powerex corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 235, n. 4 (4407) (“We have never passed on whether Cohill remands are subject-matter jurisdictional for purposes of …?1447(c) and ?1447(d)”). We granted certiorari to resolve this question, 555 U.S. ____ (2008), and now hold that such remand orders are not based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings.”