The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that defendant’s presence in the State of Connecticut was not sufficient to afford a jurisdiction and that the defendant’s registration in the state to do business and the appointment of a agent for the service of process did not constitute consent to personal jurisdiction for any and all cases brought there. In Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., ___ F3d _____ (2nd Cir. 2016), 2016 WL 641392 plaintiff sought to recover for injuries suffered by her father as a result of asbestos exposure sustained by him during his work as an Air Force airplane mechanic in locations in Europe and the United States, but not in Connecticut.
Defendant, Lockheed, has a world-wide presence and is both incorporated and maintains its principal place of business in Maryland. In 1995 it registered to do business in Connecticut and appointed an agent for service. Lockheed did not own property in the state but leased a 9,000 square foot building in Connecticut since at least 1997 and has run operations at 3 other leased locations in the jurisdiction from 2008 through 2012. In addition it has employed between approximately 30 and 70 workers in the state in the years from 2008 through 2012 (the period identified by the District Court as the focus of jurisdictional discovery). Lockheed derived about 160 million dollars in revenue for its Connecticut based work and has paid Connecticut taxes on that revenue.
The District Court ruled that plaintiff could not obtain personal jurisdiction over Lockheed in Connecticut and dismissed the lawsuit. On appeal plaintiff contended that Lockheed’s contacts with Connecticut were “continuous and systematic” enough to place it “essentially at home” in the state. The Court of Appeals noted that while Lockheed’s business in Connecticut, while not insubstantial, constituted only a very small part of its portfolio and while perhaps “continuous and systematic”, fell well below the high level needed to place the corporation “essentially at home” in one state.
Plaintiff also argued that by registering to transact business and appointing an agent Lockheed consented to general jurisdiction over it. After making a detailed analysis of this claim and Supreme Court decisions, the Appellate Court agreed with the District Court that Lockheed did not consent to general jurisdiction over it and said. “A more sweeping interpretation would give rise to constitutional concerns prudently avoided absent a clearer statement by the State Legislature or the Connecticut Supreme Court.”